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INFORMATION ADVANTAGE IN STACKELBERG DUOPOLY 
UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY 
by 
JIANMIN WANG 
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JIN XU∗ 
School of Mathematics and System Sciences, Shandong University 
 
We consider a Stackelberg model under demand slope uncertainty in an environment 
where the follower owns information advantage. Specifically, we show that the 
second mover obtains higher expected profit than the first mover when the leader only 
knows the prior beliefs and the follower gains the posterior probabilities. This result 
tells us that the leadership advantage is dominated by the information advantage when 
demand fluctuation is important. 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Stackelberg model is one of the most widely used models in 
industrial organization for analyzing firms’ behavior in a competitive 
environment. In regular perfect information, the Stackelberg leader 
preempts his follower by investing in a larger capacity, which guarantees 
him higher profits compared to the follower. However, in Gal-or (1985) it 
is shown that when two identical firms move sequentially in a game the 
leader earns higher profits than the follower if reaction functions are 
downwards sloping and lower profits if reaction functions are upwards 
sloping. Especially, the market uncertainty always influences the firm’s 
strategies and profits (Ponssard, 1976; Gal-or, 1987; Raju and Roy, 2000; 
Liu, 2005; Lu and Poddar, 2006). Gal-or (1987) presents a 
leader-follower game where both the Stackelberg leader and follower 
have private information on the random demand, and the quantity choice 
of the leading firm reveals its private information to the follower, thus 
providing the second mover with an information advantage. Raju and 
Roy (2000) find that, except under some conditions, more precise market 
information has a greater impact on profits in a Stackelberg mode of 
conduct than in a Bertrand mode. In Liu (2005) where the demand 
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uncertainty is only for the first mover, however, it is demonstrated that 
when the realized demand is far from its expected value, the second 
mover obtains higher profit than the leading firm and when the realized 
demand is in an intermediate zone does the first mover preserve its 
advantage.  
  But most of the previous literature models uncertainty in the demand as 
an uncertain intercept. The assumption of an unknown intercept often 
eliminates any interaction between a firm's expectations about its rivals' 
outputs and the market uncertainty itself. Recently, some authors model 
an alternative industry in which the slope of the demand function is 
uncertain under Cournot competition (Malueg and Tsutsui, 1996; Raju 
and Roy, 2000; Chokler et al., 2006). Slope uncertainty could arise in a 
setting in which consumers are identical and firms are uncertain about the 
number of consumers in the market.  
We analyze a linear Stackelberg model in which the slope of the 
demand function is uncertain. Specifically, we focus on the strategic 
consequence of asymmetric demand information owned by first and 
second movers. Usually, the followers in markets gain more market 
information than first movers before sinking their investments. Therefore, 
we assume that the leader only knows the prior beliefs and the follower 
gains the posterior probabilities to update its distributions of the demand 
slope using the signals more accurately. Thus, on the one hand, our model 
is a natural complement to the intercept uncertainty studied by previous 
authors. On the other hand, as an alterative representation of demand 
uncertainty, our model checks the robustness of previous models’ 
predictions about the relationship between leadership and information 
advantage. We show that if the following firm updates the distribution 
functions of demand slope parameter by receiving signals, the follower 
always earns greater profit than the leader with ex ante choice. 
Consequently, under random demand slope and the second mover’s 
information advantage, firms will have the incentive to move second, 
because the first mover’s leadership advantage is dominated by the 
second mover’s information advantage. Thus, the previous models of 
information advantage and demand uncertainty, while proving tractable, 
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understate the scope for profitable information advantage. 
Our work is organized as follows: in the next section we describe the 
model, in section 3 we derive the equilibrium, and in section 4 we 
conclude. 
  
2 THE MODEL 
 
We consider a Stakelberg game where two firms compete in quantities 
sequentially and produce identical goods, the inverse demand for which 
is given by  
          1 2( ),ip a q qβ= − +  1,2i = ; 
where iq  is firm i  quantity and 0a >  and 0β >  are parameters. The 
value of a  is known to both firms. The slope parameter β , however, is 
random, which takes on one of two values, lβ  or hβ , where 0.h lβ β> >  
It is assumed that their fixed costs are zero and the firms have equal and 
constant marginal costs. Therefore, inverse demand is intercepted as net 
of marginal cost. 
Without of loss generality, we assume the firm 1 is the Stakelberg 
leader and the firm 2 is the Stakelberg follower. Two firms possess 
common prior beliefs about β , with Pr( ) Pr( )l hβ β= 1 2= . The firms are 
asymmetrically informed about the real state of demand. Before making 
quantity decisions, the second mover receives private information about  
the value of β . Firm 2 observes the signal 2s , which supposes one of 
two values, 2ls  or 2hs . The following firm’s private signals are equally 
accurate, with the conditional distribution of signal 2s , given the real 
demand slope, being as follows: 2 2Pr( | )x xs s β β σ= = = , for { , }x l h∈ . 
Generally, suppose that 1 2σ ≥ .1 Given ignorance regarding the true 
state of nature, firm 1 can commit to a fixed nonnegative quantity 1q +∈R  
in all states of nature. Outputs for firm 2 are chosen conditional on the 
observed signals. 
    Finally, the above assumptions of the environment are common 
knowledge among the firms. 
                                                        
1 Here, symmetry of distributions is assumed only for simplicity. 
 
 4
 
3 DERIVATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM 
 
We start out by considering the maximization solved by the follower.  
Let 2I  denote the information available to firm 2 when it chooses its 
output. His objective is to: 
    
2
2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2
,( , ) [( ( )) | ]
q
MaxU q q I E a q q q Iβ= − + .                     
The first-order condition is: 
2 2 2 2 1 2[ | ] 2 [ | ] ( ) [ | ]E a I E I q I E q Iβ β= + .                       （1） 
Obviously, payoff of firm 1 under uncertain demand is given by 
1
1 1 2 1 2 1( , ) [( ( )) ]
q
MaxU q q E a q q qβ= − + .   
The first-order condition for the leader is: 
1 2[ ] 2 [ ] [ ]E a E q E qβ β= + .                                  (2) 
As noted above, previous authors modeled demand uncertainty 
through randomness in the demand intercept, a . Eq. (1) reveals one 
reason for this focus. When the demand intercept, but not its slope, is 
uncertain, β  can be factored out of the rightmost term in (1). Then, in 
the equilibrium with strategies that are linear in the information, the 
system of linear equations described by (1) and (2) can be solved for firm  
1’s and 2’s equilibrium outputs. However, suppose, as we do, that a  is 
known, but the slope parameter β  is random. Then (1) and (2) become 
2 2 2 1 22 [ | ] ( ) [ | ]a E I q I E q Iβ β= +                              (1’) 
and 
1 22 [ ] [ ]a E q E qβ β= + .                                    (2’) 
In Eq. (1’) the interaction between the unknown parameter and firm 
1’s output simply cannot be dealt with by the earlier models that assumed 
linearity of expectations between signals and the underlying state 
variables and then considered output strategies that were linear in the 
signals. This interaction can be analyzed in our model by explicitly 
considering the (finitely many) possible values of 1qβ  for a given output 
strategy of firm 1. 
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Proposition: In the two-stage game in which the leader only knows the 
prior beliefs and the follower gains the posterior probabilities to update 
its distributions of the demand slope using the signals more accurately, 
we show that the second mover obtains higher expected profit than the 
first mover. In other words, the preemptive capabilities of a Stackelberg 
leader are reduced when the demand slope is random. 
Proof.  Let 2lq  and 2hq  denote the equilibrium output strategy for firm 
2, given it has observed the signal 2 2xs s= , { , }x l h∈ . Firm 2’s first-order 
condition (1’) for 2lq , at the equilibrium, is now given as  
      2 2 1 22 [ | ] [ | ]l l la E s q E q sβ β= +  
       2 2 2 1[Pr( | ) Pr( | ) ](2 )l l l h l h ls s q qβ β β β= + +  
       2 1[ (1 ) ](2 )l h lq qσβ σ β= + − + .                            （3）
Similarly, the first-order condition for 2hq  is given as 
      2 1[ (1 ) ](2 )h l ha q qσβ σ β= + − + .                             (4) 
Let 1*q  denote the equilibrium output strategy for firm 1, and 
rearranging Eq. (2’) yields: 
  
2 2
2 1 1
* *( 2 ) ( 2 )2 2 2
l h l h l hq qa Eq q qβ β β β+ + += + = + .                (5) 
Let (1 )y σ σ= − , (1 )l hM σβ σ β= + −  and (1 )h lN σβ σ β= + − , then the 
solution of Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) provides the equilibrium outputs 
2
2 6( ) 8 ( )
12 ( )
l h l h
l
l h
N MNaq
MN
β β β β
β β
+ − + += + ,                     (6) 
   
2
2 6( ) 8 ( )
12 ( )
l h l h
h
l h
M MNaq
MN
β β β β
β β
+ − + += +                      (7) 
and 
   
2
1
*
8 ( )
6 ( )
l h
l h
MNaq
MN
β β
β β
− += + .                                (8) 
Let 2 2Pr( , )ij i jP s sβ β= = = ,2 where , { , }i j l h∈ . From (6)-(8), we have 
the expected equilibrium profits for the leader and the follower: 
      1 1 2 1 2* *[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ) 2l hEU E q qβ β β= = +  
and 
                                                        
2 It is easily verified that 2
ll hh
P P σ= = , (1 ) 2
lh hl
P P σ= = − .  
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      2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ll l l lh l h hl h l hh h hEU P q P q P q P qβ β β β= + + +  
          2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ] 2l hM q N q= + . 
Hence,  
  2 1 2 2 21 1 1[ ] { [6( ) 8 ( ) ]
2 6 ( ) 4 l h l hl h
aEU EU M N MN
MN
β β β ββ β− = + − + + ++
1
4
N  
            2 2 2 2[6( ) 8 ( ) ] ( )[8 ( ) ] }l h l h l h l hM MN MNβ β β β β β β β+ − + + − + − + . 
    Since 21 1[ ]
2 6 ( )l h
a
MNβ β+ 0> , we consider 
        2 21 1[6( ) 8 ( ) ] [6( )
4 4l h l h l h
F M N MN N Mβ β β β β β= + − + + + +  
           2 2 2 28 ( ) ] ( )[8 ( ) ]l h l h l hMN MNβ β β β β β− + + − + − +  
          3 29( ) 6( ) [8 ( ) ]l hM N MN M N MN MN β β= + − + − +  
            2 23 ( )[8 ( ) ]
4 l h
M N MN β β− + − +  
          2 2 2 43( )[27( ) 96 ( ) ]
4
M N M N MN M N M N= + + − − +  
          2 23( )[ 4 ( ) ][24 ( ) ]
4
M N MN M N MN M N= + − + + − + . 
Regarding 2 2( )[ 4 ( ) ] ( )( ) 0M N MN M N M N M N+ − + + = + − ≥ , we have 
        V = 2 2 23 324 ( ) ( 30 )
4 4
MN M N M N MN− + = − + −  
          2 23{[1 32 (1 )][( ) ( ) ] [64 (1 ) 30] }
4 l h l h
σ σ β β σ σ β β= − − − + + − −  
          2 23{(32 1)[( ) ( ) ] (30 64 ) }
4 l h l h
y yβ β β β= − + + − . 
    Let h lμ β β= ,3 then  
         2( ) (32 1) (30 64 ) (32 1)f y y yμ μ μ= − + − + − . 
On the one hand, for 1 32y ≥ , ( )f μ  is the convex function and 
(1)f 28 0= > . When (64 30) (64 2) 1y yμ = − − < , we get the minimum of the 
function ( )f μ . Thus, if 1 4μ< ≤ , ( ) 0f μ > , then 0V > . 
On the other hand, for 1 32y < , ( )f μ  is the concave function and  
(1) 28 0f = > . When (64 30) (64 2) 4y yμ = − − > , the function ( )f μ  gets 
the maximum. Thus, if 1 4μ< ≤ , then 0V > . 
Therefore, if 1 2σ = , 0F =  and if 1 2σ > , 0F > . Then, we have 
                                                        
3 Generally, fluctuation of variable μ  is not too large, so we suppose 1 4μ< ≤ . See McGuiqan, J., Moyer, R. 
and Harris, F. (2001). 
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when 1 2σ = , 1 2EU EU=  and when 1 2σ > , 1 2EU EU> .          □ 
   As a result, the leader gains the same profit as the follower provided 
that the second mover only knows the indifferent probability distribution 
of the slope. However, if the follower gains the posterior probabilities to 
update its distributions of the demand slope using the signals more 
accurately, the preemptive capabilities of a Stackelberg leader are reduced 
and the follower obtains strictly higher expected profit than the leader. 
Moreover, the second firm has an incentive to choose Stackelberg rather 
than Cournot competition. 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
In a regular perfect information environment, the Stackelberg leader 
preempts his follower by investing in a large capacity, which guarantees 
him higher profits compared to the follower. In contrast, with private 
information about stochastic demand, the second mover obtains higher 
expected profit than the first mover, which means that the first mover’s 
leadership advantage is dominated by the second mover’s information 
advantage. In fact, we can find many examples in accord with the 
conclusion. It was recently reported that Boston Scientific claimed that it 
had captured about 70 percent of new orders of drug-coated device just 
one year after Johnson & Johnson first introduced this product (Abelson, 
2004). This is because in a market with a high degree of uncertainty, the 
followers can wait and see the customers’ response to the new product 
introduced by the first movers, as well as move along the ‘learning curve’ 
of innovation. By persistently modeling demand uncertainty about the 
intercept of demand, earlier papers on random demand among 
Stackelberg competition have been unnecessarily restrictive and to the 
extend, misleading. We have shown, in a simple linear model with 
demand of uncertain slope, that the follower may have greater payoff than 
the leader when it owns more accurate information. This prediction is 
similar to that of previous models (Ponssard, 1976; Gal-or, 1987; Raju 
and Roy, 2000; Liu, 2005). 
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